defines the terms of reference and limits of what is acceptable in a given community at any given time. So, if the assumptions underlying these practices lie outside the boundaries of the present commonsense, any attempt to justify such a move using the existing standards becomes ipso facto absurd. We simply lack the proper vocabulary. Schuman, in other words, would have a hard time making the case for a supranational political entity such as the European Community using a 'nationalist' language.
The problem is not solved if decision-makers look for alternative sources to fill this gap. In a commonsensical situation there is limited acceptance for heterodox thinking or 'breaching experiments' (Garfinkel, 1984) that disturb the status quo. If decision-makers do come up with supporting reasons that are grounded outside of the existing commonsense, their actions, from an 'internal' perspective (that is, from the perspective of the present commonsense), will be incomprehensible. The present and new vocabularies are incompatible. Talking about a United Europe in the 19S0s probably sounded to many Europeans as an unrealistic or even 'foreign' idea.
In either instance ('internal' or 'external' accounts), the community in which decision-makers are embedded will find the reasons adduced unacceptable. In these circumstances decision-makers, therefore, face an apparently unsolvable predicament (what I call the 'first move' predicament). What this predicament seems to imply is that there is no way to 'reasonably' go beyond commonsense. But is that really the case?
Mainstream literature about decision-making in political science and international relations (IR) is not very helpful in addressing this question (Sending, 2001) . Most works are characterized by a sort-of 'denial' of the very existence of the problem. This denial takes different forms. Two of the most influential are what I call the 'Pascalian' and the 'Kuhnian' approaches. Although in different ways (the former adopts an 'economicist' interpretation of the logic of action, while the latter a more sociological one 3 ), both accounts fail to propose a 'reasonable' answer to the first-move predicament. But we should not give up; it is possible to find a cogent explanation that addresses this apparently unsolvable predicament. The solution I propose is language-based. It relies on metaphors, and particularly on their pragmatic function in everyday life (Schon, 1979; Petrie and Oshlag, 1979) . 'Pragmatic metaphors' help members of a community find a reasonable way to justify the undertaking of practices that break with what is the prevailing norm. As special types of cognitive 'mirrors', they illuminate the yet
